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THE PRACTICE OF INDIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATION
Abstract: India has a decade-long experience with independent regulatory
agencies in public services as an institutional transplant from the
industrialized world. Introduced at the behest of international donor
agencies, regulators in India are intended, somewhat naively, to provide an
apolitical space for decision making to assuage investor concerns over
arbitrary administrative actions, and thereby stimulate private investment.
In practice, regulators have had to negotiate a terrain over which the state
has continued to exercise considerable control. Regulators have also been
been shaped in their functioning by national and sub-national political
traditions and by administrative and political practices. The result is a
hybrid institutional form that combines politics as usual with intriguing
new, and unanticipated, opportunities for political intervention.
This paper will explore the origins of electricity regulation as a form of
institutional “isomorphism.” It will then compare the regulatory
experience in India's electricity sector across two Indian states to
understand the implications of transplanting regulatory agencies in the
global south. An examination of the process through which regulatory
decisions are reached illustrates how existing bureaucratic and
technocratic networks, transplanted procedures, and administrative
cultures combine to conservatively manage long-standing political
tensions around electricity. In seeking to manage those tensions, regulators
often take decisions – on tariff setting, for example – based on a political
reading that belies the technocratic narrative on which institutional
credibility rests. At the same time, civil society groups ranging from
residential associations to professional associations to individuals are
using newly created regulatory spaces to structure a more deliberative
decision process.
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INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSPLANT
AS
POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY: THE PRACTICE AND POLITICS OF
INDIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATION
Navroz K. Dubash*

I. INTRODUCTION
Independent regulatory agencies have entered India through the back-door,
little remarked upon and even less understood. Proponents of regulatory
bodies – notably donor agencies – view the mechanism as a way to
insulate politics from decision making. Insiders to Indian government and
administration, notably including some regulators and regulated, dismiss
regulatory bodies as one more layer of government, barely distinguishable
from preceding layers. In this paper, I suggest that regulation in India has
certainly not fulfilled the naïve expectations of the designers, but that it
has led to a process of re-making governance in India, opening doors to
the construction of regulation as a new democratic space. My aim in this
paper is to map out the contours of an emergent politics of regulation in
India by looking at the case of electricity regulation.
By looking at India I also intend to contribute to what is currently a very
thin literature on regulation in practice in the developing world, with the
possible exception of Latin America. There are good reasons to believe
that regulation in developing countries will have distinct features from that
in either the United States, or the emergent regulatory state in Europe.
Common features that shape regulatory outcomes in developing countries
include the greater presence and authority of external actors, particularly
donors, as vectors of policy transfer, the importance of consultants as
knowledge carriers and as implementers, the overbearing but
paradoxically also weak state, and the propensity for thin state legitimacy.
From a practical perspective, states in the developing world are selfconsciously re-orienting themselves toward forms of steering over
*
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ownership, without much reflection on whether and how this shift changes
the nature of politics and concerns of democratic legitimacy and
accountability. In the conclusion I reflect on some of these broader
concerns that relate to regulation in the developing world.
My point of entry to regulation in India is the electricity sector. As a
leading concern of economic reformers for over a decade, electricity is a
good example of efforts to re-make a state-owned and controlled sector
around the new vision of private ownership and arms-length regulation. In
addition, electricity regulators in India have been established at the state
level, allowing for comparison of different states with different political
and other conditions, but within the same larger administrative culture and
legal traditions. In this paper I examine electricity regulation in Andhra
Pradesh, a state with a reputation as a successful reformer, and in Delhi, an
early example of an effort to privatize electricity. My approach is
considerably informed by Hancher and Moran's (1989) device of a
“regulatory space,” which seeks to focus attention on the institutional and
political specificities of particular regulatory contexts.
The paper is divided into three sections. I begin with an exploration of
how the establishment of Indian electricity regulators can be explained
through sociological theories of institutional isomorphism. The next
section turns to the two cases, Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, to examine both
the macro- and micro-politics of regulatory agencies. A third section
explores whether and how newly established regulatory agencies provide
new spaces for democratic politics. I end with a concluding section that
sketches the contours of regulatory space for Indian electricity, by drawing
on the insights gained from the two cases.

II. “ISOMORPHISM” IN INDIAN ELECTRICITY
REGULATION
The creation of independent regulatory agencies is often understood within
the framework of a problem of delegation. Under what conditions, and
why, would a government choose to delegate authority to an independent
“non-majoritarian” body? Recent work suggests that a principal-agent
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framing of the problem of regulatory establishment is incomplete without
attention to a more sociological understanding of regulatory origins.1 In
this section, I lay out an explanation for the origins of Indian electricity
regulation based on processes of institutional isomorphism, with attention
to how regulators have become a way of signaling legitimacy within a
larger project of restructuring and reform.

A. THE TANGLED LEGACY OF INDIAN ELECTRICITY
Electricity is a “concurrent” subject under India’s constitution, which
places it under both central government and state government control.2 In
1948, the sector was organized around state-level, publicly owned and
controlled State Electricity Boards (SEBs). SEBs were crafted in the
crucible of post-independence India, and strongly shaped by the idea that
electricity was a tangible and realizable benefit that the state could
demonstrate to its citizens as a gain from achieving independence. In
particular, SEBs had a dual nature as commercial entities and as
instruments of development policy.
Since the SEBs effectively operated as extensions of the state Energy
Ministries, they have been prey to a range of garden-variety, but crippling,
problems of government in India. These span everything from internal
markets for staff promotion and placement, to graft for non-payment of
bills, to incorporation into the election financing apparatus.
Over time, the political fault lines in the sector have crystallized around
three issues: farmers hanging on to populist subsidies, industrialists
rebelling against the higher tariffs needed to support those subsidies, and
increasingly affluent and mobilized urban consumers demanding better
service. Meanwhile, finance ministries at state and central levels, backed
by international donors, have given notice that budgetary subsidies to the
sector must come to an end. By the early 1990s these oppositional forces
had become clear; by the late 1990s they were crippling the performance
of the sector.

1

See, for example, Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2002), and Gilardi (2004).
This section draws on Dubash and Rajan (2000), which reviews the recent political
economy of India’s electricity sector.

2
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State-level independent electricity regulatory commissions have been
placed in the unenviable position of untangling these knots. In India,
regulators have been created at both central and state levels, with the
central regulator responsible for interstate issues, and state regulators –
with which I am concerned in this paper -- responsible for critical
regulatory functions at the state level including tariff setting, establishing
operating regulations and monitoring the sector.

B. ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AS A “RATIONALIZED MYTH”
The steady decline of India’s electricity sector during the late 1980s and
early 1990s was coincident with a shift of seismic proportions in the
global conventional wisdom around how best to organize the electricity
sector. Electricity “restructuring” prescribes a transformation of publicly
owned and managed monopoly electricity sectors into “unbundled”
entities, subsequent privatization, and the introduction of competition
between the newly created unbundled entities.3 Through the 1990s, this
prescription, which originated in the UK and Chile, coalesced into a
standard prescription for electricity sector reform, independent of national
context. There is certainly some indication that the implications of this
approach were inadequately thought through for sectors in countries such
as India, where bread and butter management reforms were, and remain,
arguably more important than a restructuring around competitive markets.
Independent regulatory agencies are an important piece of the larger
restructuring prescription. In functional terms, they are intended to
provide the means of regulating the residual monopoly segment of the
“unbundled” electricity sector (the wires), establish and enforce the rules
of market functioning, and set tariffs in the lead-up to competitive
markets. Most significant, however, they are intended to excise politically
determined, and therefore arbitrary, decision processes and replace them
with technocratic, and hence predictable, decisions.
The quest for finances was an important part of the larger political context
for the rapid rise of electricity restructuring. Emerging at a time of a larger
global ideological shift toward the virtues of private investment, electricity
3

Patterson (1999) provides a very readable introduction to the topic. Dubash and Singh
(2005) critically review these ideas and locate the debate in Indian context.
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restructuring became the accepted precondition for attracting foreign
investment.
Electricity restructuring, then, fits well Meyer and Rowan’s (1977)
description of rationalized myths as “rationalized and impersonal
prescriptions that identify various social purposes as technical ones and
specify in a rulelike way the appropriate means to pursue these technical
purposes rationally.” Conformance to the restructuring agenda signaled
seriousness and leant legitimacy to electricity policy reform.

C. “ISOMORPHISM” IN THE INTRODUCTION OF INDEPENDENT
REGULATORS
The World Bank served as the dominant vector for transmission of the
restructuring ideas to India. A 1993 policy statement made further lending
for developing country electricity sectors conditional on progress toward a
set of policies that included greater private sector involvement and
establishment of independent regulators. As the policy put it: “…the Bank
will require countries to set up transparent regulatory processes that are
clearly independent of power suppliers and that avoid government
interference in day-to-day power company operations” (World Bank 1993,
p. 14).4
In the year the policy was issued, 1993, the World Bank brought that
policy to India and explicitly invited states to take up the bargain. Five
states initiated discussion, but only one state, Orissa, saw the process
through in the form of corporatization, privatization, tariff reform and
independent regulation (World Bank 1996). In its own statements, the
World Bank clearly articulated the role of the regulator: “...to ensure the
sustainability of tariff reform... inter alia to attract sufficient private
investment and protect the interests of consumers” (World Bank 1996,
p.7). A key contribution of the regulator to achieving these goals was “...to
insulate Orissa's power sector from the government and ensure it’s ...
4

The other conditions -- commercialisation and corporatisation, importation of services,
and encouragement of private investment – would soon become intertwined with the
emergent model of competitive electricity markets emanating from the UK, to become a
standard model of electricity restructuring applied to the developing world (Williams &
Dubash 2004).
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autonomy” (World Bank 1996, Annex 5.3, p. 2). In other words, the
fundamental purpose of electricity regulation was to create an apolitical
space for electricity decision, in large part to send a signal of credibility to
investors.5
An army of donor funded consultants descended on Orissa to elaborate
and assist implementation of this template, in a suggestion of what Powell
and DiMaggio might label “normative isomorphism” associated with the
entrenchment of a professional field. While donor and consultant led, the
reforms could not fairly be described as entirely coerced; a substantial
component of the political leadership and bureaucracy, including the thenChief Minister, supported a fundamental reform orientation. However, the
role or value of independent regulation among these domestic “reformers”
was not clear. In the opinion of an Indian consultant involved in the
process, many officials saw regulation as a requirement of funding
institutions or as a relatively costless diversionary tactic to signal
seriousness about reform.
This narrative partially supports a view of the World Bank as an
instrument of “coercive isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991),
transmitting both the regulatory form as a rationalized institution, and
providing the motivation for adoption in the form of withdrawal of
financing support in the case of non-compliance. It also suggests a role for
consultants, notably of foreign origin, as agents of “normative
isomorphism” through their professional status, which enabled them to
confer legitimacy in the realm of electricity restructuring. However, as
suggested above, there was also an element of willing adoption in the
interests of buying and signaling legitimacy by state decision-makers, but
only based on a larger perception that adoption of the model would make
little difference to decisions on the ground. I return to this “decoupling”
(Meyer and Rowan 1977) between institutional structures and work
activities in a later section.

5

The goal of insulation from political process led to interesting design debates. According
to Indian consultants, foreign consultants were naïve about how to achieve this outcome.
For example, it was at the insistence of Indian consultants that the Orissa reform act
explicitly prohibited elected officials from ever assuming office as a regulator.
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D. REGULATION EXTENDED: THE CENTRAL ACTS AND “MIMETIC
ISOMORPHISM”
The Orissa regulatory experiment was well short of being declared a
success in its early years. In brief, regulatory “independence” quickly
proved a double-edged sword: while the World Bank and state reformers
expected the regulator to rapidly raise tariffs, the regulator instead decided
that the public should not bear the burden of past mismanagement and
decided on only a moderate increase. Regulatory attention to the political
fall-out of tariff increases, while understandable and perhaps necessary,
was certainly not what the original framers of Orissa’s regulation were
hoping for. Thus while the Orissa effort could have justifiably been read as
the shifting of political contestation to a new political arena – the regulator
– it was instead read as a less-than-desirable outcome driven by the
idiosyncrasies of the individual regulators.
Despite these overtones of failure, at least with regard to the regulator’s
ability to signal credibility to investors, the Orissa approach to regulation
has rapidly spread to other states. With state after state initiating plans for
establishment of regulators – in most cases without the intervention of an
external actor such as the World Bank -- the central government was faced
with a possible proliferation of state acts under which regulatory bodies
would be established. To provide some uniformity, the central (i.e.
federal) government passed a central Electricity Regulatory Commissions
Act (1998) to provide an alternative legal basis for state regulators, which
was substantially based on the Orissa Act. Despite the Orissa experience
to the contrary, the underlying presumption that it is indeed feasible to
create an apolitical regulatory sphere simply by legislating one, was
retained more or less intact.
In 2003, as part of a more comprehensive move toward an electricity
sector based on competition, a national Electricity Act (2003) was passed,
which embedded electricity regulators within a larger project of transition
toward a competitive electricity market. The Electricity Act endowed
regulators with a range of responsibilities including tariff setting, issuance
of licenses, definition and enforcement of standards, promotion of
renewable energy, and advisory functions with regard to competition and
investment. The Act represented a culmination of a trend starting with
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Orissa, of devolving substantial powers away from the executive and
toward regulators.
The rapid proliferation of independent electricity regulators across India
and sanctioned by central legislation suggests isomorphism in a “mimetic”
vein, an attempt to derive legitimacy in a context of uncertainty
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). That regulators proliferated even in the
absence of any robust assessment of effectiveness, and in the face of a
perception of early regulatory ineffectiveness, suggests that legitimacy
derives less from effectiveness in outcome, than in a relatively impervious
ratonalising myth around regulation.

III. FROM STRUCTURE TO PRACTICE:
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND THE EFFECTS OF
“DECOUPLING”
As Meyer and Rowan suggest, conformity with institutionalized myths can
lead to gaps between institutional structure and ongoing practice, or a
process of “decoupling.” In this section I explore this decoupling effect by
examining the practice of regulation in two of India’s state: Andhra
Pradesh (AP) and Delhi. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to
explore the larger political context within which regulators are embedded.6
Recall that the kernel of the regulatory role, that which lends it
legitimizing potential, is the purported ability to insulate from politics.
Accordingly, I begin this section with a discussion of how regulation is
shaped by the “macro-politics” in each state, before turning to the “micropolitics” of regulatory decision-making.

6

Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2002) draw attention to institutional context, particularly
political leadership, as factors that mediate the pressure to delegate. While I emphasize
the intentional delegation process somewhat less than do they, their reminder of the larger
context is nonetheless significant.
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A. MACRO-POLITICS: THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS AS USUAL
The larger context for electricity reform in India, and AP and Delhi are no
exception, is the requirement for seismic, rather than incremental, change,
along with an associated re-sorting of winners and losers. Not surprisingly,
under these conditions, the extent of delegation of authority from
governments to regulators, in practice, is limited.
Andhra Pradesh (AP) is widely considered the one case that bucks the
general perception that politicians lack the “political will” for reform. At
the time the regulator was established in 1999, the Chief Minister, Mr.
Naidu, was firmly established as the leading light among state-level
economic reformers and was heavily backed by the World Bank. Indeed,
Andhra Pradesh rapidly became the poster child of reform for donor
agencies.
At the time of reform, Andhra Pradesh faced a by-now familiar set of
problems: high loss levels; abysmal monitoring of electricity use; threat of
industrial flight from the grid; a work force potentially implicated in rentseeking; and weak and declining infrastructure quality. The context for
reforms, including creation of a regulator, was one of stimulating and
guiding a dramatic change in the sector. The solution devised by the
consultants but endorsed, and vigourously so, by Naidu, rested on
privatization of the sector and the introduction of competition as a
necessary end.
As a prelude to privatization, the state owned system was subjected to
bread and butter management improvements, such as new and improved
monitoring systems, re-aligning staff incentives around performance, and
striking a wage for results deal with labour. These measures were actively
supported by the political leadership, symbolized by weekly meetings held
between Mr. Naidu and the top management of the electricity utility, and
yielded impressive results in terms of a turn-around in key outcome
indicators.
However, the privatization effort was placed on hold, because of
apprehensions that it would be politically unpopular in the 2004 state
election, and because other state experiences – Delhi and Orissa – had
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garnered unfavourable publicity. In 2004, Mr. Naidu nonetheless lost the
election, and privatization disappeared off the road map entirely.7
Regulation was, therefore, a necessary element in the reform scheme, but
by no means the lynchpin. Indeed, Naidu viewed the regulator’s role in
quite circumscribed terms as being limited until competition began. By
contrast to Orissa, where the state government was supportive but stepped
back after the regulator was established, in AP the government was
driving the implementation of reforms. Hence the regulator faced a less
stern test; it did not have to be a gatekeeper against its own creators to
nearly the same extent. Moreover, the responsibility for stewarding change
did not lie with the regulator, but instead with the government, acting
through the state utility. In Mr. Naidu’s words, “government has to go for
reform, not the regulator.”8
The Delhi experience, by contrast, has entirely been dominated by the
larger context of a high profile privatization in Delhi. Following the
experience of Orissa, widely viewed as a failure, Delhi's attempt at
privatization was a high stakes effort to get it right. The pressure has been
enormous; failure in Delhi would reinforce a signal that privatization in
Indian electricity is a hopeless cause, and cause investors to be even more
wary of entering the country's electricity sector.
As in other states, the central objective of reform was to lower technical
and, more important, commercial loss levels that together hovered above
50%, and to improve service quality. The context within which the
regulator was set was one of rapid and dramatic sectoral reform and
change.
The privatization arrangements constructed by the government constrained
the regulator in several ways. The regulator lost control over many of the
standard regulatory tools: performance targets, the rate of return, and the
ability to link tariffs and economic performance. Underlying this
arrangement was a perceived need by the Delhi government for stability
and predictability, especially in tariff setting, in order to reassure new
private investors. The Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC)
vigorously protested the government’s policy directive circumscribing its
role, but to no avail. Ultimately, the Delhi regulator began its work with a
7

Interview with consultant involved in AP reforms, 3/5/06.
Interview with Mr. Naidu, former Chief Minister of AP, Hyderabad, 1/6/06.
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somewhat contentious relationship with the government, a shortened list
of instruments with which to do its work, minimal experience and
capacity, a highly charged political context, and two very powerful and
sophisticated private companies to regulate.
In quite different ways, therefore, the two state experiences suggest that
delegation to independent regulators as a means of “credible commitment”
has little resonance. In AP, the government retained substantial control
over decisions. In Delhi, while the government was far clearer about
boundaries, and formally delegated some responsibilities, it did so within a
highly truncated “zone of discretion” (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002).

B. MICRO-POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONAL DECOUPLING
If governments substantially retain control, how is the rationalizing myth
of a technocratic regulator that ensures political insulation maintained? I
suggest the answer lies in a better understanding of the micro-politics of
regulation, and manner in which it facilitates decoupling of structure from
outcome.
Three networks shape the internal organizational space of Indian
electricity regulators: the Indian Administrative Service – the elite
governmental bureaucracy, the technical electricity fraternity, and
consulting firms. The combination of and balance between these three
networks to a considerable extent shapes how the regulator mediates
relationships with the government.
The IAS is a ubiquitous presence in electricity regulators; in 2003, ten of
twenty one electricity regulators were drawn from the IAS (Prayas 2003).
Dense IAS networks facilitate informal consultation and back-room
decision. In addition, regulatory independence from the executive is
challenging to pull off if regulators themselves come from a career
administering political decisions. This tension is exacerbated when
regulators are appointed directly from senior governmental positions,
requiring them to shift, virtually over-night, from administering and
defending government positions, to acting as an impartial referee. While it
is by no means necessary that these pressures are entirely determinative, it
is quite likely that the predominance of individuals from an IAS

12
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background curtail the space for emergence of a new and distinct
regulatory culture.
The technical fraternity of India’s public electricity utilities constitutes the
second network that shapes the regulatory space. Emerging from over fifty
years of state ownership, employees of state owned electricity utilities
constitute the only available pool for staff, and for regulators with
technical expertise. The dependence on public employees is reinforced by
the regulator’s human resource rules, which closely follow government
scales and promotion criteria. The heavy representation of the technical
fraternity within electricity regulators reinforces the image of the regulator
as minimally distinct from the government. Finally, with a background
operating within vertically integrated monopoly utilities, regulatory staff
brings little knowledge of regulatory practice, let alone new trends in the
organization of electricity such as introduction of competition and
markets, ostensibly the rationale for transformation of the sector.
This shortfall is made up by consultants, who play a substantial role in
regulation and constitute the third network that shapes regulation.
Consultants are in many ways the intellectual change agents, and play the
key role in translating broad policy directions into specific policy
measures. The intellectual positions that inform consultants are informed
by their typical background as recent business school graduates, with a
smattering of ex-public sector employees, and are further developed and
propagated through broader consultant networks.
Within the Andhra Pradesh regulator, decisions are shaped by interaction
within the three components of regulators dominated by an IAS
perspective, staff and consultants. Regulators use judicial metaphors to
describe internal interactions. Consultants often prepare base materials on
the request of the Commission, particularly on new policy matters such as
performance based regulation. Commissioners then listen to the range of
arguments before making a decision. Staff is often seen as representing the
consumers’ point of view and indeed, there is a separate section in each
tariff order prepared exclusively by staff, independent from the
Commission, which lays out a critical public perspective. Consultants
typically represent and argue the “reform” view, which hews closely to the
restructuring formula. Thus, the internal process appears to rest on
dialogue, but ultimately filtered through an IAS perspective.
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The manner in which these internal arrangements lead to a form of
institutional “decoupling” that allows the regulator to maintain a
technocratic fiction is illustrated by an example of tariff setting.
The Andhra Pradesh regulator is statutorily empowered to independently
set tariffs. In theory, this should be done by simply setting tariff to meet
the revenue requirement of the utilities based on a given rate of return.
Indeed, in its first year, the regulator had applied such a formula, leading
to a steep tariff hike, which in turn led to substantial protests. In
subsequent years, there are good indications that the regulator has been
more circumspect, balancing the political realities of tariff hikes, the
budget available for subsidies, and the requirements of financial health for
the utilities.9 Specifically, the regulator has taken to setting an efficiency
based “performance target” for the utilities to meet, which in many years
obviates the need for a tariff increase. Doing so brings obvious political
benefits to the government. In other words, the AP regulator has devised a
means of side-stepping the straitjacket of technocratic procedure, even
while framing its intervention – an efficiency enhancing performance
target – within the larger narrative of technocratic decision-making,
thereby facilitating a perception of regulatory independence from politics.
Note that this approach is facilitated only because management reforms
introduced by the AP government have provided the utility a reasonable
amount of financial space. This space has allowed the regulator to play its
balancing role without having to substantially transgress boundaries of
either political or economic acceptability.
The Delhi case provides a similar example of decoupling, despite the more
clearly articulated delegation enshrined in the privatization agreement. In
one tariff setting exercise, a straight accounting of costs, returns and
revenues would have required the regulator to approve a massive 35%
tariff increase. A hike of this scale would have been politically ruinous,
particularly given a public perception that some of the private companies
were failing to deliver on promises of service improvements. In response,
the regulator, working with consultants, came up with the idea of creating
a “regulatory asset” which allowed the tariff hike to be spread over future
years. In subsequent years, a more modest 10% tariff hike led to public
protest and an eventual roll-back of the tariff, confirming the regulator’s
political judgement.
9

Interview with APERC staff, 26/5/06.
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Both these examples suggest that far from apolitical and technocratic
regulation, Indian electricity regulators actively consider the political
implications of their decisions, and, in order to accommodate politics, find
creative ways of decoupling their decisions from the technocratic
moorings of their institutional structures.

IV. A NEW POLITICS OF REGULATION?
The de-coupling of regulatory structure from practice potentially opens
interesting and creative new spaces for politics around electricity.10 With
the presumption of one, correct, technocratic answer to regulatory
decisions set aside, the door is left open for independent regulatory
agencies to become new sites of politics around electricity. That these
politics may potentially, at least, have a potential democratic nature is
made possible by the enshrining in electricity regulators of administrative
law procedures around transparency, participation, and recourse.11 In this
section, I examine to what extent and how regulators have functioned as
sites for democratic politics in AP and Delhi.
In AP, the regulator has established a procedural framework enabling
access to information about the sector, a required process of public
hearings in particular for tariff orders, and a mechanism for filing petitions
and pleadings. For example, the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory
Commission (APERC) has a well functioning and useful website,
diligently holds hearings that are well attended, including in locations
10

In his discussion of the rise of the regulatory state in Europe, Majone (1994) makes the
point that procedural safeguards, such as public hearings, are an important part of
building the legitimacy of a regulatory state. Prosser (1999) has perhaps developed this
argument the farthest in his work on public utilities in the UK, elegantly arguing not only
for procedural safeguards, but a form of reflexive proceduralism that examines the
conditions under which participation provides necessary safeguards and regulatory
legitimacy. Lodge (2004) catalogues and provides critical reflection on the instruments
through which transparency and accountability can be facilitated, while Hira et. al. (2005)
for an interesting cross-country empirical comparison of procedural measures in use in
electricity regulation. See, also, Nakhooda, Dixit and Dubash (2007) for an attempt to
develop and test indicators of regulatory governance across countries.
11
I discuss the genesis of these procedures elsewhere (Dubash, 2008).
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outside the capital city, has translated regulatory materials into the local
language, and has established an Advisory Committee including labor,
agricultural and consumer representatives. All of these procedural changes
constitute a sea change from the entirely non-transparent closed decisionmaking process under the pre-reform regime.
There remain, of course, some substantial holes in full implementation of
the spirit of these procedures. For example, in one case the APERC
convened a hearing on an issue only after substantial external pressure,
and once it did so, issued a sixty page order the very next day, which
clearly could not have incorporated insights from the hearing process
(Electricity Governance Initiative – India, 2006). In addition, there remain
grey areas on information disclosure, such as on investment plans, where
the APERC has no clear policy and procedure, and by default withholds
access to these materials.12 Hesitation and confusion on such matters has a
great deal to do with the newness of the institution and its staffing by
individuals who bring parochial and paternalistic attitudes characterized
by former monopoly state utilities. There is little doubt, however, that
under external pressure, the institutional space for regulatory governance
is slowly but certainly becoming more open.
Regulatory procedures on information and participation have expanded the
regulatory space in AP, to include labor groups, political parties, consumer
groups, individual consumers, industry associations, farmers, and other
public bodies such as municipalities. A scan of the tariff order for 2006-07
suggests that these opportunities are, in fact utilized. A total of 46 different
individuals or institutions filed a total of 330 objections to the tariff orders
of the three distribution companies in the state.13 Of these, 302 were
“substantive” pertaining to issues that had to do with details of the tariff
process, as compared to 28 “grievances” that were related to more narrow
concerns that affected only the complainant or contained little or no
substantive argumentation. Not surprisingly the largest number, 106, were
by individual consumers, but substantial numbers of comments, in each
case between 25 and 70, were filed by political parties (42), public entities
12

This observation is based on a personal visit, during which the authors were allowed to
open and view files on investment plans on the premises, but only after initial denial
followed by a personal appeal to the Chairperson.
13
Based on analysis conducted by the authors using data from tariff orders supplemented
with information from APERC. This analysis excludes local language petitions, which
are currently being translated.
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(28), industry (36), unions (68) and consumer organizations (43).
Interestingly industrial buyers and others with deep pockets are not
disproportionately represented in these comments.
While in some cases the comments reflect only a basic knowledge of the
electricity sector and a nascent understanding of regulatory process, a
handful of consistent interveners have won the respect of the Commission,
being described as “almost equivalent to Commission staff in caliber”.14
These regular and respected interveners are almost all from consumer
groups, in some cases are individuals, rather than from industrial groups.
Indeed, the latter were dismissed as narrow and parochial in their
comments, rather than focusing on issues in a broader public interest.
Respondents at the utility also express enthusiasm for consumer
involvement, particularly in scrutinizing power purchase costs, which
directly affect their own bottom line.
The flurry of public engagement stimulated by creation of the APERC has
begun to re-shape regulatory politics at three levels. First, consumer
groups have actively worked to broaden and deepen the procedural rules.
For example, they have demanded hearings at district levels, requested and
won local language translation of orders, and forced broader and
transparent review of power purchase agreements.
Second, they have somewhat disrupted and injected themselves into the
triangular negotiation between APERC, the Government and the utility.
The main avenue for doing so is forcing release of information, and
forcing public, documented, responses to raised objections, thereby
limiting the extent to which adjustments in key parameters can be made
behind the scenes. For example, farmer and consumer groups sought
release of the agricultural census to measure rural power use conducted by
the APERC. They have also sought and obtained public disclosure of the
dispatch order of generating plants to ensure that one generator is not
unfairly favoured over another.
Finally, they have achieved some substantive gains, most significantly in
the area of power purchase and approval of new generating plant
investment, which accounts for the majority of total electricity cost.15
Significantly, this is truly a public interest issue, as savings in power cost
14

Interview with APERC, 2/5/06.
Interview with senior management of APTransco, 19/5/06.
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accrue to all consumers, and cannot be captured by any single group.
Gains in power purchase were achieved by forcing open the issue for
debate before the regulator. In addition to arguments made by consumer
groups, the resultant opportunities allow powerful actors such as the utility
(for whom lower costs mean healthier finances) to pursue the issue to a
greater extent than they otherwise would have. Indeed, in one case the
process has led to strange bedfellows, with a petition jointly filed by the
utility, the Peoples Monitoring Group on Electricity Regulation, and a
journalist with Communist Party affiliation acting in his individual
capacity. The expanded scope of regulatory governance has created new
strategic opportunities for key actors in the sector.
The power purchase issue also illustrates how the APERC reacts to the
various pressures it faces. In the case of one new generation plant, it
withstood substantial pressure from the government, informally expressed,
to considerably lower profit rates and therefore costs to consumers.16 In
another case, faced with considerable government pressure, the regulator
was arguably lax about ensuring adequate fuel supply for the plant, and in
the process allowed the risk of fuel supply to be passed on to the
consumer, potentially substantially hiking costs.17 The latter case is
currently under further appeal. The implications of these two cases for the
regulator’s independence from versus control by the government rest in
the details of each case. However, that these issues are debated, and that
any gains are made at all, is almost certainly facilitated by public
engagement and scrutiny.
The broadening of regulatory space to include consumers of all sorts,
public interest groups, and media may yet be the most far reaching change
brought about by independent regulation. While regulatory governance is
at an early stage, the AP experience suggests that future developments will
be well worth exploring.
In Delhi as in the Andhra Pradesh case, the statutory requirements for
hearings, access to information and mechanisms of recourse have created
an important new space for regulatory governance in Delhi. However, the
weaknesses in the practical application of these procedural requirements
are also considerable. For example, the DERC website is incomplete and
16

Interview with APERC official, 1/5/06.
Interview with citizen petitioner before APERC, 2/5/06, and with senior management of
APTransco, 19/5/06.
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ill-organized, which along with the lack of an effective library or an
organized index of documents makes accessing documents extremely
difficult in practice. The hearings are not open to the public, but only to
those who have submitted comments. This said, the wide availability of
detailed tariff orders to the public, and the ability of consumers and
interested parties of all sorts to present their views before the DERC, and
obtain an answer from the distribution companies, represents an entirely
new institutional space for public deliberation.
In 2004-05 the DERC received 212 objections to its tariff orders from 69
different objectors.18 Consumer groups or individuals accounted for about
40 of these while there were about 20 objectors from within industrial user
groups. Of the total concerns expressed, by far the majority, (625 out of
683) were substantive complaints as compared to more narrow grievances.
By contrast to Andhra Pradesh, however, no small core of competent and
knowledge intervenors had appeared to win the respect of the regulators.
For example, DERC staff says they do not find public submissions helpful
in improving the quality of tariff orders. And indeed the capacity base of
intervenors is thin. Thus, the apex body of Delhi's Resident Welfare
Associations (RWAs) which includes the wide spectrum of
neighbourhoods, including well to do areas, files petitions based on
patched together pieces of information, without deploying any resources to
obtain specialized knowledge or skills.19 Similarly, the Chamber of
Commerce hires a single consultant to write their comments, with little
involvement or feedback from the staff, or mechanism of either quality
control or ensuring that comments truly represent member interests.20
However, Delhi consumers are extremely active and skilled in the broader
political arena around electricity. The apex body of RWAs skilfully uses
the media to directly critique the companies and the DERC and to force
engagement and consideration of their appeals at the highest political
levels. While it is an effective tactic in the context of any particular
skirmish, this approach has the effect of de-valuing and de-legitimizing the
DERC as a forum for reconciling competing interests.

18

Based on analysis conducted by the authors using data in DERC tariff orders.
Interview with consumer representative, 20/1/06.
20
Interview with Chamber of Commerce representative, 31/1/06.
19

2008]

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANT AS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

19

A political mapping of consumer voices in Delhi is also instructive and
helps explain the emphasis on organized politics rather than on the DERC.
The most vocal subgroup, the RWAs, speak for a distinct sub-section of
Delhi's consumers self-identified as “middle class”, but who include the
top end of Delhi's income strata. They place themselves in opposition to
small scale and illegal industry owned by local politicians and slum
dwellings which contain those politicians vote banks. Both of these
categories of consumers, they argue, receive free power at their expense.
From this perspective, the DERC is relatively helpless; the problem and
the solution, lies in the political process.
As a result of the dominance of the RWAs in the public discourse around
electricity, the issues that have attained the highest profile in the DERC
are questions of metering and billing and other consumer grievance issues,
after an initial period when the DERC was seen to be non-responsive.
Some of the upstream and more technically detailed matters also before
the regulator, notably investment scrutiny, have tended to be ignored.
Another important consequence is that voices of lower income groups and
especially slum dwellers are seldom heard within the DERC process.
In sum, the effect of creating a new institutional space for regulatory
governance has had relatively little beneficial effect on the regulatory
process in Delhi. To the extent there are any substantive wins, they are on
the issues closest to consumers – metering, billing and grievance redressal.
The more significant observation is that, if anything, consumer action has
by-passed the DERC, to re-focus attention on organized politics.

V. CONCLUSION
India is far from being a regulatory state in Majone’s (1994)
characterization of the shift from public ownership, planning and
centralized administration to regulation through structuring of incentives
and signals. Understood as an essential complement to privatization,
regulation has persisted and multiplied even as efforts at privatization have
ground to a near halt. Intended as a buffer against political forces to enable
private participation, regulation has now become an end in itself, the most
tangible expression of, or even a substitute for political reform.
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Thus constructed, electricity regulation in India risks being absorbed and
accommodated within the existing political-bureaucratic system, with very
little impact on decision making. The creation of separate agencies has
introduced an element of transparency in decision making, but the impact
of this is reduced by the embedding of the process within well worn
networks. The signaling and credibility functions are muted by the
overarching control of the political process. At root, the pattern of decision
making in the sector is only transformed if there is a sustained political
impetus to change. The only way beyond this dependence on the
favourable alignment of larger political forces on a state by state basis is
through re-conceptualizing regulation as a new political space, an intent
quite removed from the original designers of electricity regulation. In
other words, since the problem of electricity in India is at root a political
problem – unchecked state control – the way out lies not in institutional
design, but in the explicitly political solution of new, democratic and
legitimate regulatory spaces.
The Indian electricity example also suggests considerable diversity in
outcome at which two cases can only hint. It reinforces the importance of
understanding historical timing, bureaucratic traditions and customs, and
organizational attributes. In India, the story is particularly bound up with
understanding the shifting nature of the state. An inductive approach to
regulation would appear necessary to fully sketch out the character of
regulatory spaces.
At the same time, the Indian experience does suggest some systematic
influences that come into play when independent regulation is introduced
to developing countries. I conclude this paper with a short discussion of
two of these themes, which might be taken to the study of regulation in
other parts of the developing world.
Attention to the role of donor agencies as vectors of institutional
isomorphism may be a fruitful line of inquiry in many developing
countries. The often uncritical acceptance of regulatory institutions as part
of a package deal also comes with a lack of reflection on the role of
regulation as a shaper of politics, other than the unchallenged assumption
that regulation can make politics less relevant. That regulators are often
introduced as part of donor driven and defined agendas may homogenize
regulatory experience in some respects, and mute the impact of historical
timing and geographic specificity.

2008]

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANT AS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

21

Finally, the Indian experience suggests that attention the potential for
regulation to be conceived of as a new and democratic political space – is
worth exploring. Regulatory governance in developing countries brings
the challenge of weak and under-resourced civil society and possibly an
over-bearing state with little regard for procedural safeguards. However, in
the context of other weak and illegitimate public institutions, regulation
has the benefit of being a newcomer without the baggage of the past. If the
Indian example proves to be more generally true, the theoretical interest
and normative contribution of regulation may well lie in its democratic
potential.
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